Russia defies the West and chooses escalation in relations with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia

The more the West fears for a war, the greater its prospects become. A series of recent events (North Korea dispatching soldiers to Ukraine, campaigns designed to influence the result of the elections in the Republic of Moldova and Georgia) have shown that going easy on the aggressor is not the best way to keep in check a conflict that, at any rate, was meant as the first phase in the final confrontation with the West. The more Western politicians have qualms about Putin, the more opportunities they create for him to act, encouraging him to further pursue his plans.

Russia and North Korea seem to be preparing for a great war

North Korea's direct intervention in the war in Ukraine should show the world that very few of the mechanisms that described the Cold War are still valid today. Even if it has not changed much in its outward manifestations, it is clear the regime in North Korea has survived the fall of communism and isolation, because it has learned the hard lessons of what has happened in the world. The nuclear program, the Palace economy, the caste-based division of society and the elevation of chauvinism to state policy, exceeding the boundaries of radicalism in the nationalist-socialist fantasy, and above all, the continuation of the Kim dynasty, have all led to the emergence of a new type of state, which differs fundamentally from the structures inherited from Kim Il Sung.

Today, Russia and North Korea both share in the belief that they have no allies they can rely on in the war they are waging. Just like Vladimir Putin, Kim Jong Un no longer distinguishes between themselves and the peoples they lead, and are willing to do whatever it takes to strengthen their regime and their own dictatorships. Partially isolated and cut off from Western systems, both are desperate to avoid economic and political dependence on China, which they know that, in due time, will exact a heavy toll on them. Large-scale sales of weapons from North Korea to Russia and the direct participation of Pyongyang's soldiers in the war, serving as support forces or simply there to gain combat experience, prove that the two regimes share a common anti-Western and anti-Chinese platform. Furthermore, Kim Jong Un knows his regime cannot survive indefinitely without strong allies, especially without their resources, whereas assistance to Moscow at a critical moment will make Russia more interested in the existence of the Kim dynastic dictatorship.

On top of everything, the training of North Korean troops, which, much like Ceausescu's army, are rather used as labor force serving the purposes of modern warfare, shows that Putin and Kim are confident war is likely to break out soon. Unlike Emperor Xi, who has quietly jettisoned part of president Deng Xiaoping's symbolic legacy while preserving China's global profile, Putin and Kim know they have gone too far in their hopes for a new compromise with the international rules-based order. War is almost the only option for them, one they hope to win if they want to dictate the terms of peace.

Despite retaining very little of the regimes of whom they claim to be the ideological descendants, both Putin and Kim are obsessed with history, especially the wars their countries have fought. Therefore, because they know war is imminent, Moscow and Pyongyang are focusing their joint efforts to choose the moment of its outbreak, and the incoherent reactions in the free world provide them with possibilities that were not expected until recently. The West's shocking reluctance to allow Ukraine to use its weaponry to strike targets inside Russia has done little to slow down the escalation of the conflict, nor has it stopped its expansion. North Korea’s involvement in the war proves that, even when we chose to turn a blind eye, Ukraine is still just one of the frontlines opened by dictatorial powers. Russia's victories in this regard only boosts its maneuverability, increasing its leverage in countries it deems vulnerable.

Pressing the attack in Ukraine, Russia is also expanding its operations in Moldova and Georgia

The results of the elections in Moldova and Georgia showed that unconsolidated democracies are too weak to fight alone against Russia's huge corruption and disinformation machine. A realistic assessment of the situation we are witnessing both in Moldova and in Georgia should start from the realization that Moscow's policy has managed to leave a bitter mark on these societies. To make a meaningful change, the West must do more than just express support, provide modest financial aid or introduce feeble sanctions.

Supported by European capitals and Washington within the strict limits of political correctness and viewed with suspicion in Bucharest, Maia Sandu is taking on the immense concoction of corruption and lies that Moscow has managed to fabricate in Moldova virtually all by herself.

The testimony of Pavel Belomestny, a former FSB agent, now a refugee in the USA, provided in his interviews to Vladimir Osechkin, the founder of the Gulagu.net project, shows the scale of Russian involvement in Moldova. Today, Russia does not have a network in Moldova, but an entire system, bringing together politicians, officials and organized crime networks, who can manipulate a good part of the population however the Kremlin wants. No wonder that Putin abandoned the tactic of grooming Moldovan politicians, dispersing his agenda by means of a plethora of public figures, one more bizarre than the other, and he is now about to reap the “fruits” of the new tactic.

In addition, the overwhelming support for the Kremlin's agenda provided by national minorities in Moldova, not only Gagauz or Russians, but also Ukrainians, shows that Moscow will quickly instrumentalize an apparent inter-ethnic conflict in Moldova, should its interests be threatened. The fact that Putin managed to bring the national minorities of Moldova and Ukraine into an anti-Western platform shows that the explanations have less to do with the uninspired policies of Chișinău and Kyiv, as some would like us to believe, and more to do with the efficient coordination of networks headquartered in Lubyanka Square.

In Georgia, Bidzina Ivanishvili and his “minions” from the “Georgian Dream” managed to legitimize themselves with a score that allows them to form a single-party government, and above all to amend the Constitution. You don't have to be Nostradamus to realize that very soon, president Salome Zurabishvili will be deposed, with all the necessary scandal, and Georgia can be considered a new total victory for Putin. The public congratulations conveyed by Viktor Orban with visible satisfaction, even before the announcement of the official result, show that Putin has all but bagged Hungarian politics, while the Schengen accession of Romania can already be considered a success.

Were we to also factor in the advance of Russian troops in southeastern Ukraine, as well as the rather critical reaction of the West to the “peace plan” suggested by president Zelenskyy, we can conclude that the conflict in Ukraine has already started evolving into a large-scale war, and the attempts of certain political figures to slow down its development are a way of shunning hard facts. Against this backdrop, the empty promises of peace made by some Romanian leaders, very similar to those of Irakli Kobahidze from Georgia and Alexandr Stoianoglo from Moldova, show that the Russian system in Moldova has strong ramifications in Romania as well, and the unanimous lack of courage and vision from Bucharest authorities will only makes its task easier.