Uncertainty linked to the official language of the Republic of Moldova, 31 years after this country proclaimed its independence, reflects just how hard defining and accepting a national identity has been. The country’s inability to settle linguistic disputes and break away from “Moldovenism”, a Soviet construct, is one of Chișinău’s many failures: after 31 years of independence, the country is still unable to fully control its territory and to ensure its energy and military security.
Between the language of national rebirth (Romanian) and the language of Soviet occupation (Moldovan)
31 years after Moldova’s break with the USSR, the country is still struggling with legal queries over the official language of this state. The Declaration of Independence mentions “the Romanian language” hat had already been proclaimed the official language under pressure from the national rebirth movement at the end of the 1990s. The Constitution adopted in 1994, when Parliament was dominated by left-wing forces, stipulated, however, under Article 13, that “the official state language […] is the Moldovan language”. In practice, this term references Soviet theories about a so-called Moldovan language, other than Romanian. Nearly 20 years would pass until the Constitutional Court would decide that the Declaration of Independence prevails over the Constitution – therefore, the official language of Moldova should be Romanian. The 2013 ruling of the Constitutional Court was never enacted, however, by amending the Constitution, not even by the time the article was published.
Such recognition of the spoken language in the Republic of Moldova would resolve to a great extent the identity crisis still persisting in Chișinău, as well as all ambiguities deriving from the “differences” between Romanians and Moldovans. All this time, populist politicians such as communist leader Vladimir Voronin are still represented in the Moldovan Parliament and are fostering “Moldovenism” and the obsession for Moldova’s statehood. These should be defended right now not just by Romania, but also the EU and the USA, Voronin claims.
Moldova’s energy reliance on Moscow, a threat to its own security
The economic context looks rather complicated itself. For three decades, the Republic of Moldova has been totally dependent on Russian gas deliveries from Gazprom. Successive governments preferred to pay the lowest price for Russian gas, sacrificing political freedom.
Today, the Republic of Moldova is 100% reliant on Russian natural gas and is constantly threatened by uncertainty regarding Gazprom’s deliveries. Furthermore, the separatist region of Transnistria in the east has already amassed a record-high debt of 9 billion USD. Although this is a corporate debt, Moscow politicians periodically use this opportunity to assign the debt to Chișinău. For over 15 years, Transnistria hasn’t paid a cent for Russian gas deliveries, a scheme that actually helps Russia finance this breakaway enclave.
In addition, when it comes to its electricity resources, the Republic of Moldova is reliant on the electricity produced at the Cuciurgan power plant in Transnistria, owned by the Russian company Inter RAO. Until recently, the Republic of Moldova was procuring 100% of its electricity from this thermoelectric power plant that is using Russian natural gas to produce electricity. After continuous hesitation, Chișinău has managed to secure 30% of its electricity input from Ukraine.
Furthermore, for the remaining 70% of Moldova’s power demand, Tiraspol is blackmailing Chișinău on a monthly basis with long environment permits for the Râbnița Metallurgical Plant (MMZ), which provides dumping prices for end products. MMZ is an unfair competitor for all the other metallurgical plants in the region, including Romania, since it benefits from free-of-charge natural gas from Russia and is the largest contributor and injector of currency for the separatist region of Transnistria. It is de facto controlled by two local oligarchs, Viktor Gușan and Ilya Kazmaly, who have strong ties with Moscow. Although Romania has finished constructing the Iași-Ungheni pipeline as early as last year, this has seldom been put to use, particularly in the autumn of 2021 to regulate gas pressure. Additionally, the current Moldovan Cabinet favored an Indian company facing corruption allegations instead of a consortium of Romanian businesses when awarding the contract for building a high-tension line linking Vulcănești to the Moldovan capital city, which is supposed to transport electricity directly from Romania to the Republic of Moldova.
The price difference in the public tender was approximately 30,000 USD while the final offer stood at 27 million USD. It’s hard to believe that the Indian company, which relies on cheap raw materials from Ukraine and local labor force, will complete such a contract of strategic importance in due time.
Transnistria – Moldova’s inability to ensure its territorial integrity
The Transnistrian conflict has been pending for over 30 years. Not even to this day, when Moldova has much more leverage in its negotiations with Tiraspol, have the authorities been able to use this leverage to end the conflict. While approximately 11% of its territory is controlled by a regime subordinated to Moscow, the Republic of Moldova is incapable of settling its “security predicament”. As a result, some 1,700 Russian troops are present on its territory.
Transnistrian paramilitary forces total an estimated 8,000 servicemen, while Russia’s ammo depot in Cobasna provides the latter with a tactical military advantage, at least in theory.
The issue is that these troops stationed in Transnistria are keeping part of Ukraine’s forces in check. Ukraine is forced to maintain troops on the Transnistrian border for fear of a surprise attack. Ukraine is equally unable to enter Transnistria, since from a legal point of view this would be tantamount to attacking the Republic of Moldova. Therefore, the situation is dangerous not just for the Republic of Moldova, but for Ukraine too.
In the years that have passed since the Republic of Moldova proclaimed its independence from Moscow, no government has shown real concern for endowing the country’s military, which is currently in very bad shape. Moreover, pro-Russian forces in Moldova have been promoting the idea that the Republic of Moldova doesn’t even need an army, since Transnistria will never attack, and Moldova would anyhow have zero chances of pushing back a Russian attack.
The war outside Moldova’s borders shows, however, that this conception was flawed, and that the Republic of Moldova would need minimum military endowment, at least in terms of deterring a possible attack from Transnistria ordered by Moscow. Still, Moldova’s military spending remains under 0.4% of its GDP.
How can Moldova capitalize on the political and economic reality?
At present, the Republic of Moldova is not taking advantage of the Ukrainian-Transnistrian border being shut down. After Kyiv’s decision to close the border after the start of the war, a large part of the goods Transnistria smuggled into Ukraine, particularly via the port of Odessa, were henceforth denied.
Chișinău failed to seize this opportunity and it continues to apply no taxes to merchandise going in and out of Transnistria. In other words, through its lack of action, Moldova is contributing to keeping the Transnistrian regime afloat.
Chișinău prefers behind-the-scenes talks with the regime of Transnistrian oligarchs who own the Sheriff holding and who’ve monopolized the entire economic activity across the Dniester.
Tiraspol is not at all in a position to make demands or offer terms, particularly after the Republic of Moldova was cut off from the ENTSO-E European energy network. Constitutional authorities need to be much more firm with regard to Tiraspol, which is now totally reliant on Chișinău’s greenlight to be able to export its goods.
Paradoxically, after 31 years of independence, now enjoying relations with the EU that are closer than ever, having obtained the EU candidate status, the Republic of Moldova is at the same time completely dependent on Moscow and continues to handle the Transnistrian conflict very poorly.
The Romanian identity is being downplayed in Chișinău, and the topic is approached in a European, neutral manner, both in Chișinău and in Bucharest. Still, trade relations, the number of joint ongoing or planned projects and political exchanges have never been better between the two countries.
It remains to be seen whether at the end of these military and economic crises, the Republic of Moldova will solve this identity dilemma as well and will call things for what they are by enforcing the law. Such a move would put an end to any and all speculation and geopolitical populist assertions designed to fuel hatred and frustration in Moldovan society.
