The discovery in recent years of significant deposits of natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean area has triggered a competition with possible long-term ramifications, not just for countries that own the deposits in question, but also on the European Union’s strategic sovereignty. Due to the scope of its single market, the EU could become the number one destination for any surplus of gas extracted from the area or for any electricity produced using that gas. Russia seems to perceive the whole undertaking as a threat to its own commitments in the EU, to which it exports nearly two thirds of its natural gas output. Although it is a strategic provider of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to European markets, the United States of America until recently supported regional cooperation project, thus encouraging competition against Russia.
It should be mentioned that, despite the huge exploration and exploitation costs, the natural gas reserves have attracted not just national companies from the region, but also enterprises with global operations, such as ENI (Italy), Shell and BP (the United Kingdom), Total (France), ExxonMobil and Chevron (USA), Novatek (Russia) or Qatar Energy. Under these circumstances, it’s no surprise people are already talking about “a new great game” (a term used in the 90s to designate competition in Afghanistan over who controlled the route for importing natural gas from Central Asia, a reference to the original Great Game of the 19th century, when the Russian and British empires competed for influence in Afghanistan), the focus this time being the Eastern Mediterranean.
Whilst many expected the discovery of new natural deposits would boost regional cooperation, it has instead led to an escalation of regional tensions. The long-lasting conflict between Israel and Lebanon, which remains unresolved in the absence of a peace treaty, continues to limit communication between two countries with jurisdictional waters in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. The authorities in Ankara, Nicosia and Athens seem unwilling to capitalize on this opportunity in order to “pacify” their trilateral relations, choosing instead to amplify the historical Turkish-Greek rivalry. Under the iron-fisted regime of Erdoğan, who has managed to antagonize numerous regional governments by means of his overall aggressive policies during the last decade, Turkey has also been trying for three years to subvert plans to export natural gas to the West. As a result, Turkey has been excluded from the regional cooperation project known as the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF, founded in 2020 and officially registered as an international organization in March, 2021). EMGF seems to rely on relative support from the EU which, alongside the United States and the World Bank, is listed as an EMGF observer.
The Eastern Mediterranean gas reserves, EU’s alternative to fossil fuels imports from Russia
By means of historic initiatives, the European Community/Union has been an important player in the Middle East and in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean for many decades. From the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) in the 1980s to the Mediterranean Policy (the Barcelona Process) after 1995, the EU has always had its eye fixed on this region. Its latest programme, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), was introduced after 2003. The EU used ENP as an institutional framework to funnel billions of Euro over the years into numerous more or less successful development projects, in an attempt to help stabilize the countries in its vicinity by means of a process of democratic reforms. The ultimate purpose has always been to create “a ring of friends” with limited and restricted access to the single market, in order to augment it without endangering its spatial continuity and functionality.
The EU imports (although there are significant differences across Member States) approximately 60% of its total fossil fuel consumption (mainly natural gas and oil, with very little coal). In 2019, it imported 60.6% of its total fuel consumption, a record high in the last 30 years. The EU’s reliance on Russian imports, which has a share of 25% for oil deliveries, is much higher in terms of gas imports (approximately 43% in 2019 and 48% in 2020). It should be mentioned that the latter figure accounts for 70% of Russia’s total gas exports. Therefore, Russia is more reliant on EU purchases than the EU is on Russian imports. Thus, the true problem for Europe is not its dependency on Russia per se, as much as Moscow’s growing assertiveness. More often than not, Russia uses its contribution to the European energy market as a tool for blackmail in its relations with the community bloc, which in turn snowballs into serious negative consequences for other countries, such as Ukraine or the Republic of Moldova.
In this context, the rich natural gas deposits uncovered in the Eastern Mediterranean basin have become a major stake for the EU, for a number of reasons. Fossil fuel imports from the Mediterranean area don’t account for a large share of the EU’s total consumption, although the percentage is significant. Moreover, they can become a reasonable alternative to diminish the EU’s dependency on Russian imports, to a certain extent and under specific conditions. This won’t happen as long as Brussels refuses to accept natural gas as an alternative source of energy that should reflect its zero-carbon goals for the single market. To date, an estimated 2,000 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas have been discovered in the eastern sector of the Mediterranean Sea, with potential prospects for further exploration. The EU’s net gas consumption stood at 358 bcm in 2019 and 326 bcm in 2020. Although the deposits explored so far in the Eastern Mediterranean could fully cover this intake for a long time (for a maximum of two decades), current and subsequent explorations might reveal additional reserves. They could prove extremely important for replenishing the EU’s strategic reserves, providing a valuable trump card in negotiations between the EU and Member States and Russia (which makes the single energy market so utterly important).
Secondly, states holding proprietary ownership of the gas pockets explored so far in the Eastern Mediterranean might also develop a serious interest to invest in the necessary infrastructure in order to export gas to Europe. Considering the logistic, economic and political drawbacks hampering the trading and delivery of natural gas to Asian or African markets, the EU is a prospective destination for gas exports, also providing the advantage of a single energy market that is strictly regulated and predictable. The interest the EU has manifested could have also translated in investments in the necessary infrastructure. The EU not only became an EMGF observer, but at the end of a decision-making process expected to conclude in the first half of the year, it might also become one of the Forum’s main donors. And yet, the financial, ecological and hence political costs of this endeavor are discouraging.
In the best-case scenario, the natural gas deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean could be exploited through liquefaction and transportation via the existing infrastructure, which could be streamlined by further expansions and carefully planned modernizations. LNG prices remain high, and the quantities available for transport will never exceed pipeline exports. A second means of exploiting the surplus of natural gas in the area would be to use it to produce electricity, which can then be exported to Europe at lucrative prices. The current pipeline network is however inadequate, a topic which I’ll address in a moment.
All things considered, the EMFG has suggested exporting gas directly via a Cyprus-Crete pipeline (EastMed) to continental Greece, capable of transporting not just gas, but also a mix of hydrogen and natural gas. By integrating state-of-the-art technologies, EastMed might be refitted to transport just hydrogen, which could be produced in refineries powered by the gas extracted from the Mediterranean. We’re thus talking about a project that, to a certain extent, accommodates the EU’s decarbonized initiatives over the next three decades, aimed at making the single market greener. This aspect, adding to the fact that natural gas is less polluting than oil or coal, has already encouraged the European Commission to recently propose that natural gas and nuclear energy be classified as climate-friendly energy sources.
The EastMed pipeline, a belated project in the context of renewed efforts to combat climate change
The huge costs and the provisional contribution of natural gas to the EU’s commitments to make the transition towards green energy turn the EastMed pipeline into an unprofitable investment. The sophisticated technology and the huge distance of approximately 1,900 kilometers it needs to cover have been a drawback from the very start, putting initial costs alone at a staggering 7 billion Euro. Besides, the extraordinary length of the pipeline is owed to the fact that it was originally designed to bypass Turkey, a country that has grown more unpredictable under its current regime. Hence a number of political issues that might further complicate the already tense situation in the region, with potential long-term effects. Although EastMed could become a Project of Common Interest (PCI), eligible for EU financing by means of instruments such as Connecting Europe Facility, a final decision on this matter could be suspended.
The main issue has to do with incompatibilities between the exploitation of natural gas and commitments voiced at European and global level, including in the US, to shift towards green energy. A specially appointed European Commission official expressed misgivings over the commercial and ecological viability of EastMed and natural gas ever since October 2021, underscoring the existence of other alternatives, such as hydrogen, biogas and synthetic gas. In this context, the Biden administration announced the White House’s intention to withdraw its support for the pipeline, shifting its focus on electricity interconnectors in Africa, the Middle East and Europe. This would inadvertently help countries in the area benefit from the deposits in question not by exporting the gas itself, but rather the electricity produced using this gas. Furthermore, during this fleeting period of transition towards green energy, the gas can be exported in its liquefied form by means of existing and modernized LNG terminals and technologies. In other words, investing in EastMed is rather ill-advised right now, because it is unlikely to produce any significant long-term profits that would warrant a several-billion-Euro investment. Nevertheless, the situation could take a radical turn if the pipeline is actually designed to transport the hydrogen obtained from the natural gas in the region, and if Turkey develops an interest for this strategy.
Many analysts were taken by surprise when Washington informed its Greek partners it will implicitly withdraw its support for EastMed, but its reasons are commonsensical. Although the United States remains, alongside the EU and the World Bank, an EMGF observer, the request had been submitted by the Trump presidency, an administration that was overtly hostile to worldwide commitments to decarbonize global economies. The Biden administration, on the other hand, takes these commitments very seriously. And a billion-Euro investment in a pipeline is an effort that is fully at odds with such commitments.
We might also see the EU possibly withdrawing its support for EastMed, although abandoning this project would by no means thwart the EU’s effort to assert and consolidate its “strategic sovereignty”. Let’s not forget that, at the request of France and other Member States, the European Commission suggested that nuclear energy should also be included on the list of climate-friendly energy sources, and EastMed’s prospect as a “European project of common interest” could be attributed to other projects. We should also factor in European and American support for the construction of large electricity grids. The EuroAfrica interconnector is already under construction, a system of subsea power cables linking the national energy grids of Egypt, Cyprus and Greece, which is expected to be rendered fully operational by the end of 2023. Adding to that might be further European investments in systems that would ultimately facilitate large transfers of energy (electricity and/or hydrogen extracted from natural gas) from the Eastern Mediterranean. We might also see investments in shorter pipelines that can transport natural gas to modern LNG refineries in Egypt, from where it can be exported to European processing plants.
The European Union’s (geo)strategic sovereignty and the complicated relations with Turkey
The natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean can further be exported via the existing pipeline infrastructure from Egypt and the Arab Peninsula to Europe, via Turkey. This scenario however largely depends on the stabilization of northern Syria, an area of strategic importance for the transfer of fossil fuel. Besides, Ankara unfortunately remains one of the “issues” in the region. Most pundits argue that, through its assertive policies in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey excluded itself from any existing and future agreements over the exploration and delivery of natural gas from this maritime basin. The self-exclusion should be interpreted in the broader context of Turkey’s undertakings in its relations with Western partners, particularly after the establishment of a presidential regime with unlimited powers, approved by a slim majority (only 52%) of the Turkish population in the 2017 referendum.
Although it purchases large quantities of LNG from the USA, Ankara’s relations with Washington have hit a historical low, owing, among other things, to the purchase and ownership of Russian S-400 missile systems. The White House has excluded Turkey from its F-35 programme, threatened to multiply existing sanctions and dealt a heavy blow to Turkish state nationalism by recognizing the “Armenian genocide”.
Turkey’s relations with the EU have also deteriorated. After the EU formally recognized its candidacy in 1999 and accession negotiations kicked off in 2005, Turkey gradually slowed down democratic reforms starting 2010, shifting towards a more authoritarian rule. After the Constitutional amendments introduced in 2017, the legislation, jurisprudence and government practice spelled the end of the judiciary and central bank’s independence, whereas individual freedoms and collective rights fell strictly under government control. As a consequence, accession negotiations are de facto suspended indefinitely. The topic is seldom or never debated in the Turkish public sphere, which suits the government in Ankara. Every now and then, the authorities throw insults at European leaders, accusing them of being fascists, especially when their targets have criticized Erdoğan’s regime. Turkey’s aggressive rhetoric has lately intensified with respect to Greece and Cyprus, two countries that stand in the way of Ankara’s geopolitical ambitions.
In the Eastern Mediterranean, the regime in Ankara has managed to make more enemies in the last two decades than in the Republic’s entire 100-year history. Although Turkey’s relations with the United Arab Emirates seem to be improving, the Erdoğan-AKP administration remains a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization with a long-standing anti-Western agenda. This is a significant deterrent in the way of establishing productive contacts with the region’s “heavyweights”, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian conflict and the support it provided to fundamentalist rebels in their fight against the Kurds and the government regime have also further complicated relations with the USA and other Western partners, but also with Russia. The same goes for Turkey’s participation in the conflict in Libya, where it backs the government in Tripoli, controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood. The “Libyan affair” has prompted Ankara to ratchet up its aggression, the effects of which have damaged Turkey’s relations with the West, as well as pushed back the country to the periphery of regional politics, if not excluding it altogether.
In November 2019, the Erdoğan-AKP regime struck a deal with the government in Tripoli to draw out exclusive economic zones in the Eastern Mediterranean, which virtually blocked access to the area and isolated Cyprus from Greece. Athens responded by signing an agreement with Egypt in August, 2020, whereby it refused to acknowledge the zones drawn by Ankara and Tripoli, as the region claimed by Greece and Egypt overlapped with that economic zones established under the Turkish-Libyan treaty. Turkey further raised the stake by launching maritime skirmishes with the goal of preventing explorations carried out by Western companies (the first such exploration activities had started in February 2018, carried out by the Italian energy giant ENI).
Such shenanigans continued, threatening to unleash a full-scale conflict, so Greece and Cyprus called on EU and NATO to intervene. The two have so far managed to keep Turkey in check, at least for the time being. However, tensions continue to mount. Greece is enhancing its defense capability with the contribution of France (military technology) and the USA (military technology and military bases), whereas Ankara is investing a lot in its existing technologies. Nevertheless, Turkey was given a firm warning when it was excluded from the EMGF. Erdoğan and his staff are currently going to great lengths to restore Turkey’s former influence in the region. Yet Turkey is unlikely to succeed as long as it is still tied to the Muslim Brotherhood and maintains an aggressive approach to Syria. Turkey’s disruptive policies in the Eastern Mediterranean, arguing Northern Cyprus, an entity without any international recognition, has legitimate claims in the maritime area, will unlikely yield any benefits.
Moving towards green energy and the consolidation of Europe’s strategic security
The deterioration of relations between the current regime in Ankara and the EU is extremely important in the given regional context. A country with a key strategic position promotes a policy hostile to the EU, namely towards the biggest community bloc, whose influence in global trade can never be matched by any national actor, considering its global interests are commensurate to its influence. Its authoritarian regime and the degradation of its democratic institutions obstruct Anakara’s European integration agenda. By maintaining an aggressive tone at regional level, Turkey risks being further isolated in a conflict against an adversary it never truly understood, I would say. Perhaps this is also because an entity such as the EU is sui generis – never in its history has Turkey faced an even remotely similar opponent.
Should it continue to oppose Europe’s regional interests and global goals, Ankara risks triggering a powerful response from Brussels and other influential European chancelleries. It would come as no surprise if Turkey’s actions actually contributed, alongside the Russian threat and other elements, to shaping up a much clearer definition of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). And the EU’s common energy security policy provides a sound basis for development for the CFSP as well.
The first steps have already been taken, and the EU’s decarbonization drive can be interpreted as the keystone of its entire common security strategy. Bearing in mind all the aforementioned arguments, a single market undergoing a process of decarbonization will implicitly become less reliant on fossil fuel imports (natural gas and oil) from countries ruled by authoritarian regimes, including Russia and other states from the Caucasus or OPEC. As a result, transit countries such as Turkey, with deep-seated authoritarian impulses, will play a less important strategic role. Fossil fuel, including the natural gas deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean, will remain relevant for a time in this “new great game”. But only for a short time.
