Bulgaria: the year in disinformation and ambiguous narratives

2023 started with fears that the political stalemate and the snap election cycle will continue for even longer. However, it was possible to carve a coalition of parties that had previously refused to cooperate. The coalition managed to amend the Constitution and obtain Bulgaria's accession to the Schengen area, expected in March 2024 (only with ports and airports); probably in 2025 the EURO zone will follow. The ruling coalition has a clear pro-Western and pro-Ukrainian discourse, but this was not the only kind of discourse heard in 2023 in Bulgaria: pro-Russians were increasingly vocal, and the channels that conveyed Moscow's messages multiplied.

Anti-LGBTQ+ discourse, sovereigntism, populism

Bulgaria’s political stalemate was resolved for good in June after tense coalition talks resulting in a cabinet led by Nickolai Denkov of We Continue the Change. The outcome was a result of the general elections in April – the fifth in just two years. Facing widespread voter fatigue, the two major pro-Russia parties in Bulgaria – the Bulgarian Socialist Party and Revival – went back to basics by adopting already developed false narratives, with the hope they would click with the society in the same way as before.

The Bulgarian Socialist Party, the successor of the repressive Communist party dissolved in 1990, tried to reach the clear cut conservative, nationalist and anti-West group of the voters by framing the entire election campaign around its call for a “referendum against gender ideology”, despite that at the time there was no recent case of an educational or legislative aimed at increasing the rights or visibility of the LGBT+ community. In fact, Bulgaria’s authorities became even tighter on the subject - a controversial ruling by the Supreme Court from February furtherly limited the rights of transgender people in Bulgaria and their options to change ID’s to match their gender. The Socialists’ agenda was unsuccessful in preventing the party’s free-fall: they only gathered 8.03 per cent of the popular vote, their worst ever turnout.

It was a busy year for Bulgaria's far-right too. As Veridica predicted in December 2022, the forthcoming adoption of the Euro currency became a target of disinformation: Revival centered their campaign on demanding a referendum against the euro, referring to the retiring the lev as a loss of national sovereignty. This was of Revival’s benefit as the party made their best ever result (14.6) and came in third, right after mainstays GERB and their major opposition - the reformist We Continue the Change party.

“Referendum” became a political catchphrase during the first half of 2023, as There’s Such People, also in a process of losing voter support following various erratic decisions between 2021-2022, gathered signatures for a poll on Bulgaria becoming Presidential republic - in this way, stepping closer to pro-Kremlin President Rumen Radev’s orbit.

There’s Such a People – who were instrumental in the fall of the short lived 2021-2022 coalition after leaving the cabinet of We Continue the Change’s Kiril Petkov – played a bigger disruptive role in the autumn. Bulgaria also went to mayoral elections in October and similarly to the last few election rounds, a combined machine and paper ballot voting was planned. However, machine voting was removed as an option by the Central Election Committee following a complaint from “There’s Such a People” that the process might be compromised, with no details provided. This was largely interpreted as a move to limit votes to the candidates of We Continue the Change and Democratic Bulgaria. On October 31, the Supreme Court in Sofia overturned the committee’s decision, greenlighting machine voting again for the run-offs (due to the large number of paper ballots deemed invalid – over 600,000 in the mayoral elections in 2019 – machine voting has been promoted a more trustworthy option by the reformist parties).

Russian propaganda intensified through 2023

While the establishment of a new ruling coalition moved Bulgaria towards a semblance of political stability (and kept it in the pro-EU, pro-Ukraine camp), Russian propaganda in the country intensified. According to research, Russian propaganda in the Bulgarian online media has more than tripled in the second quarter of 2023 compared to the same period in 2022. This is mainly a byproduct of an increasing number of mushroom websites, sometimes circulating up to 3,500 pro-Russia articles in peak days.

In December, the dismantling of a major Soviet-themed monument in Sofia also reignited debates on Moscow’s legacy and influence in Bulgaria, in this way also bringing ideological clichès on both sides back in the public dialogue.

As Factcheck.bg, Bulgaria’s only independent info verification platform, pointed out on December 15, the words of Russia’s spokeswoman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Maria Zakharova found an echo through the country’s soft on Kremlin politicians. Zakharova described the removal of the Monument to the Soviet army as a “barbaric act” and a sign that fascism is rehabilitated – similar and sometimes identical phrases were used by President Radev, Revival leader Kostadin Kostadinov and politicians from the Socialist party.

Pro-West, anti-Russia rhetoric has been used for political whitewashing

While the pro-Russian and anti-EU outlets and politicians are increasingly vocal, the pro-Western and pro-Ukraine camp remains fragmented, with some in Bulgaria questioning the real allegiances of some of the politicians in that camp.

For example, oligarch Delyan Peevski – whose influence has been a subject of protests a decade ago and who came back from his exile in Dubai to successfully run as MP of GERB-friendly Movement for Rights and Freedoms party in 2023 – has been expressing unconditional pro-EU and pro-West positions, even taking part in anti-corruption amendments, once pencilled in to limit the influence of GERB and his party. And all of this, despite Peevski being sanctioned under the Magnitsky Act and exposed for offshore assets in the Pandora Papers in 2021.

On December 15, Peevski criticised Bulgarian National Radio for planning to broadcast an interview with the Russian ambassador Eleonora Mitrofanova and thus taking part in Russia’s hybrid war - already recorded, the interview was taken off air. On December 28, he called for the state security services to investigate the presence of journalists from “Rossiya 1” channel in Sofia.

Peevski’s performative protection role mirrors GERB leader Boyko Borissov search for rebranding through similar statements in the last year and positioning his party as an authentic pro-European and pro-NATO political force. This comes after Borissov was hotly contested, not long ago, by other pro-Europeans, most notably GERB’s current coalition partners, for his legacy of alleged widespread corruption.

The fragile nature of the cabinet has even given birth to a specific slang: even politicians and analysts in local media now refer to the government as “sglobka” (“the ready made”, “the put-together one”).

The parties are united by a common vision for 2024-2025: leading Bulgaria in the Schengen zone in 2024 and the Euro zone in 2025 but also solidifying the country’s Euro-Atlantic profile.

If the two opposing blocks in the ruling coalition continue to overlap in their ambitions, Bulgaria will maintain stability. However, that stability might come at a cost: a loss of the pro-Western camp’s appeal. And then, the government’s pull away from Moscow’s sphere of influence may prove to be less of a definitive turn, and more of a temporary policy.