Nicușor Dan and the governing coalition have decided to send all future gas production from the Black Sea to Ukraine, according to a false narrative promoted by the AUR Senator Petrișor Peiu.
NEWS: The PSD-PNL-USR-UDMR regime has lost even the last shred of reason and the last vestige of shame: yesterday, with Nicușor Dan’s signature and to the applause of a coalition driven to hysteria by the idea of destroying any semblance of Romania’s sovereignty, our country signed the most shameful document in history, second only to the friendship treaty with a defunct USSR, signed by the Iliescu regime on April 5, 1991!
The document signed by Nicușor Dan stipulates that Romania’s future gas production from the Black Sea be stored in Ukraine for the purpose of “ensuring Ukraine’s gas needs, as well as the safe storage of production from the Neptun Deep field.”
To clarify what Nicușor Dan did by signing this document: he initiated the process of sending Romgaz’s share of future production from the Neptun Deep field to be stored in Ukraine. If 7–8 billion cubic meters per year are extracted there, Romgaz’s half—3.5–4 billion cubic meters per year—will end up in Ukraine to be stored and, obviously, consumed.
NARRATIVE: Romania’s gas will be sent to Ukraine, which will use it according to its own needs.
PURPOSE: To promote an anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, to provoke and amplify social tensions, to validate one’s own conspiracy theories.
Romania does not have enough storage capacity for the amount it is expected to extract
WHY THE NARRATIVE IS FALSE: Right from the start, we note the same confusing manner in which pro-sovereignty propaganda promotes its anti-Ukrainian narratives of Moscow origin. Petrișor Peiu posted the English version of the framework arrangement on energy cooperation between Romania and Ukraine, without providing a Romanian translation of it, subsequently “explaining” what the agreement between the two heads of state “entails.” In reality, the document does not automatically provide for the storage of future Romanian gas production in Ukraine, but rather that the two parties have agreed “to explore the possibility of using Ukraine’s underground gas storage facilities to store gas from the Vertical Gas Corridor, as well as gas from future production in the Black Sea, as part of the Neptun Deep project.” Therefore, we are dealing with a mere declaration of intent, not a binding contract that imposes legal obligations.
To better understand why Romania is exploring this possibility, however, we must analyze the factors that influenced the decision. Currently, there are only two companies in Romania that own natural gas storage facilities—Depogaz (wholly owned by Romgaz) and Depomureş (controlled by the Engie group). Depogaz operates five storage facilities, with a total capacity of approximately 2.87 billion cubic meters, while Depomureş operates a single facility with a capacity of 300 million cubic meters. A simple calculation shows that natural gas storage facilities in Romania slightly exceed 3 billion cubic meters. Given that experts estimate the Neptun Deep project will produce 8–9 billion cubic meters of gas annually, which will be added to the current production of approximately 9 billion cubic meters, the issue of storage capacity naturally arises, even if we consider only Romania’s share of 4–4.5 billion cubic meters per year.
By any logic (economic, political, geographical, etc.), the obvious solution is to look for storage facilities as close as possible, “in neighboring countries.” Given that the Republic of Moldova lacks gas storage capacity (gas is stored in Romania—55%—and Ukraine—45%), Serbia and Hungary do not offer the most reliable guarantees, given their obvious proximity to Russia, and Bulgaria has only a single storage facility with a capacity of just 500 million cubic meters (a project to double this capacity was halted in 2024 by an investigation by European prosecutors into the misuse of EU funds), the only viable solution is Ukraine, the European country with the largest natural gas storage capacity, approximately 30 billion cubic meters. Next on the list is Germany, with a capacity of approximately 24 billion cubic meters. Italy has a storage capacity of about 17 billion cubic meters, and France of approximately 13 billion.
Other countries are already storing gas in Ukraine
For this reason, nearly three years ago, European gas traders began storing natural gas in Ukraine, taking advantage of the low prices and available storage capacity there. The decision is part of a series of agreements between the European Union and Ukraine, through which Kyiv aims to maximize the use of its enormous energy infrastructure, currently underutilized due to the suspension of gas supplies from Russia. This strategy involves the EU producing or importing gas from Norway, the UK, the US, the Middle East, etc., storing it in Ukraine during the summer, and using it in the winter, when consumption spikes. Ukraine would thus become a regional storage hub, not just for “Romanian” gas, but for the entire continent. Although there are a number of risks, given that the country is in the midst of a war, these are considerably mitigated by the fact that the large storage facilities are located mainly in the west of the country, far from the front lines, and are relatively protected and operational even under conflict conditions.
Despite Senator Peiu’s completely false claims, storing gas in another country does not change its ownership, and Ukraine will not have the right—even in emergency situations—to use those reserves for its own needs without the consent of the owner company and without complying with the contracts in place and international trade rules. Furthermore, decisions regarding gas extracted from the Black Sea will ultimately be made by the companies operating the Neptun Deep field (OMV Petrom and Romgaz) and not by the Romanian state (“the PSD-PNL-USR-UDMR regime”).
Romania is part of the European energy market
However, there is another reason—both technical and legal—why some of the gas extracted from the Black Sea might inevitably end up on the regional market, even if Romania would prefer to use it entirely for its domestic needs. It is not an obligation to “give it to others,” but rather a consequence of how the European energy market operates, as regulated by the EU legislation, of which Romania is a part as a member of the EU. In this regard, in recent years, several interconnectors have been built or modernized between Romania and its neighboring countries (Hungary, Bulgaria, the Republic of Moldova), such as BRUA, one of the most important pipelines in the region, built specifically to allow the flow of gas from the Black Sea to Central Europe. Thus, through the indirect connections with Ukraine created in this way, “Romanian” gas can also reach Ukrainian storage facilities, from where it can be purchased by the host country as well, if necessary, and commercial contracts can be concluded for this purpose.
The central principle of all these regulations is that gas flows freely between member states, provided the necessary transmission infrastructure exists. This means that a country cannot permanently block exports, and companies can sell to the highest bidder. In an open market, such as the European one, the simple logic applies: if the price in Romania is lower, gas is sold for export; if the domestic price is higher, it is sold in Romania. However, these decisions are based on sound economic reasoning, not politics, and they can lead to significant financial gains, in addition to increasing energy influence in the region.
Petrișor Peiu, from controversial privatizations to economic nationalism
CONTEXT: Having fallen into the shadows due to the outbreak of the conflict in the Middle East, the false narratives about Ukraine received a breath of fresh air with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to Bucharest, during which several bilateral cooperation documents were signed between Romania and Ukraine, including a declaration formalizing the strategic partnership between Bucharest and Kyiv.
The proponent of the false narrative examined today, Petrișor Peiu, is currently a senator for the AUR party and the party’s vice president. Although he describes himself as “anti-establishment” and promotes “economic nationalism,” he has previously held high-ranking positions in several governments and state-owned companies. From his position as an economic analyst—as he likes to present himself—Peiu has been aggressively campaigning for years for the nationalization of OMV Petrom, where, quite coincidentally!, he holds shares worth over one million lei. Between 1998 and 1999, he served as an advisor to Prime Minister Radu Vasile, a position from which he was involved in the privatization of Romtelecom, considered at the time to be highly controversial. Between 2001 and 2002, he was once again an advisor to the prime minister, this time Adrian Năstase, in whose government he also served as head of the Department for Economic Policy and as vice president of the Foreign Investment Agency, both positions carrying the rank of undersecretary of state.
In his most recent government position, Peiu was involved in the controversial sale of Petrom to OMV, a transaction whose initial negotiations took place while he was serving as an advisor to the prime minister. In addition to these roles, he served as a member or chairman of the boards of directors or as a special administrator at Romtelecom, Electropuetre Craiova, Sidex Galați, and Omniasig. In 2022, Peiu was on the verge of being appointed by the Ciolacu government as a member of the board of directors of the strategic company Transgaz. Previously, he had launched several furious attacks against the company as Transgaz expanded its pipeline network so that Romania could import natural gas from sources other than Russia. The PSD decided not to proceed with the appointment. His candidacy was ultimately rejected by Transgaz’s leadership after the PSD withdrew its support.
We conclude this profile of one of post-December Romania’s most skilled political turncoats by noting that between 2020 and 2022, Petrișor Peiu served as economic program coordinator at the Realitatea Media Group, which operates the television station of the same name—the media entity in Romania that has received the most sanctions for promoting fake news and disinformation.
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