The war in Transnistria broke out because of Russophobia, the Russian Foreign Ministry writes, falsely claiming that Moscow tried to regulate the conflict, although in fact it fueled it.
NEWS: The main cause of the conflict on the banks of the Dniester in the late 1980s and early 1990s was tied to the political and social processes linked to the collapse of the USSR. Among these were restrictions Chișinău had introduced with regard to linguistic and other rights of the minority population of Moldova. The slogan promoted by radical nationalists regarding the “historical reunification” of Moldova with Romania had a serious impact on the separation of the population of Transnistria (Russians, Ukrainians, Moldovans and others) from the central authorities in Chișinău.
[...] Russia adopted an active response, searching for solutions to the conflict. Thanks to the actions of the 14th Army of Russia, the armed phase of the conflict between Chișinău and Tiraspol was stopped in the spring-summer of 1992. Subsequently, on July 21, 1992, the presidents of Russia and Moldova, in the presence of representatives of Transnistria, signed the Agreement “On the Principles of the Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Transnistrian Region of the Republic of Moldova”. In July 1992, the peacekeeping operation started, with the creation of the Mixed Peacekeeping Corps, consisting of Russian, Transnistrian and Moldovan forces, the Joint Control Commission, the Joint Military Command and military observers.
[...] Russia made its own efforts to resolve the conflict. As a result of these efforts, in 2003, the parties signed the “Memorandum on the Basic Principles of State Organization of the Unified State” (“Kozak Memorandum”). The signing of this document was thwarted by the Moldovan leadership under political pressure from international observers – Washington and Brussels.
NARRATIVES: 1. The Transnistrian conflict broke out due to nationalism and Russophobic policies of Chișinău. 2. The Kozak Memorandum, proposed by Moscow, would have been a dependable solution for settling the Transnistrian conflict.
PURPOSE: To promote the Kremlin's narratives about Chișinău’s exclusive responsibility for the outbreak of the conflict and Russia's role as a “peacekeeper” in the region. To promote the idea that Moscow was an honest mediator, interested in stability, and that the project of federalization of the Republic of Moldova under Russian patronage would have represented a legitimate and fair solution.
WHY THE NARRATIVES ARE FALSE: Tiraspol’s reason for proclaiming independence in 1990, against the backdrop of the collapse of the USSR, was the “threat” of unification with Romania, the undermining of national minorities and the Russian language. In fact, several historians believe that this was actually a reaction of the political and economic elites on the left bank of the Dniester, affiliated to Moscow, in an attempt to maintain the status and privileges they had acquired in the Soviet era. Transnistrian separatism “was not a revolt of minorities, but of political and economic elites”, American historian Charles King argues.
The 14th Army of Russia, deployed on the left bank of the Dniester, intervened in the Dniester conflict on the side of the Tiraspol separatists, controlled by Moscow.
One of the tactics of Russian propaganda is to glorify the role of the peacekeeping mission in preventing the escalation of a new conflict in Transnistria. However, the mission has lost its relevance, especially in recent years, and Chișinău has been calling for many years in international forums to replace this military force with a civilian mission under an international mandate. In turn, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has called for the transformation of the peacekeeping mission.
The peacekeeping mission has often been criticized for its inefficiency, but also for serious incidents, such as the shooting of a young man by a Russian peacekeeper in 2012.
The Kozak Memorandum proposed by Moscow prompted society-wide debates and protests in Chișinău, amidst fears that its provisions would lead to the so-called “Transnistrianization” of the Republic of Moldova, that is, maintaining Moldova in Russia’s sphere of influence of. In a 2013 report, even the pro-Kremlin TV station NTV published images from the protests in Chișinău and mentioned that the memorandum was drafted under pressure from Moscow.
Transnistria, which accounts for merely approximately 11% of the territory of the Republic of Moldova, would have had excessive prerogatives and rights and could have blocked any important foreign and domestic policy decisions. In fact, the Russian Foreign Ministry is promoting a document that would have kept the Republic of Moldova in its sphere of influence or, as some experts have argued, would have de facto transformed the Republic into a new Kaliningrad.
BACKGROUND: The region of Transnistria in the east of the Republic of Moldova was annexed to the former Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic in the Soviet period, in exchange for regions in the south and north of Moldova being transferred to Ukraine.
Over March-July 1992, a military conflict broke out in Transnistria between the separatist regime and the constitutional authorities in Chișinău. Russia was involved in the Transnistrian conflict on the side of the separatists, deploying a military unit that succeeded the 14th Soviet Army.
After the 1992 war in Transnistria, the Agreement on the Principles of the Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Transnistrian Region of the Republic of Moldova was signed on July 21, 1992 (also known as the Ceasefire Agreement), which stipulated the establishment of a peacekeeping corps consisting of soldiers from the Russian Federation, the Republic of Moldova and the breakaway region on the left bank of the Dniester. At first, the corps comprised 4,800 soldiers, but over the years their number was reduced to less than 1,400 soldiers, according to the expert publication zonadesecuritate.md.
Russia also has a military contingent in the region, a successor to the Soviet 14th Army, which was also involved in the Transnistrian conflict on the side of the separatists. Officially, this unit guards the ammunition depot at Cobasna. In 1999, Russia promised it would vacate the depot and withdraw its troops, but it has not fulfilled this promise to date. Currently, all of Chișinău’s efforts at getting Moscow to withdraw its armed forces from the territory of the Republic of Moldova have been interpreted by Russia and the authorities in Tiraspol as an attempt to sabotage the peacekeeping mission, although the two matters are separate.
At the end of 2003, that is, in the second half of the mandate of the communists, with Vladimir Voronin at the helm of the Republic of Moldova, Moscow and Chișinău were very close to signing the so-called “Kozak memorandum” (Dmitri Kozak, then deputy head of the presidential administration in the Kremlin, is considered the main author of the document), which stipulated the federalization of the Republic of Moldova, whereby the self-proclaimed Transnistrian Moldovan Republic would become a subject of the Russian Federation and have the right to establish its own state institutions - Parliament, presidency, government, its own Constitution, state insignia, etc. The plan also provided for expanded autonomy for Găgăuzia, and the two autonomous entities would have had the right to appoint 13 of the 26 senators in the bicameral Parliament. The influence of Transnistria and Găgăuzia in the Senate would have been even greater, given that its other 13 members would have been appointed by the House of Representatives, which would have also included representatives from Găgăuzia and Transnistria. The structure of the Constitutional Court would have been similar, and the “Moldovan” and Russian languages would have had an equal role in the administrative system.
Although it would have controlled approximately 35% of the Senate and appointed 4 out of 11 judges to the Constitutional Court, Transnistria would have had a contribution of less than 17% to the federal budget.
According to another controversial provision of the Kozak Memorandum, Russia would have maintained military forces on the territory of Transnistria for a definite term (up to 17 years, according to some sources, confirmed by the Russian Foreign Ministry, or up to 49 years, according to another draft of the memorandum). In fact, there were almost 20 drafts of the Kozak Memorandum, Vladimir Voronin told Radio Free Europe.
Talks on the Kozak plan lasted about a year and several sources claim that it was supposed to be signed on November 25, 2003 in Chișinău, including by Russian leader Vladimir Putin, who was reportedly turned away from his plane after news broke out that Vladimir Voronin had changed his mind. The decision was upheld despite the fact that the draft document had provoked major protests from the opposition in Chișinău. Later, some sources claimed that authorities in Chișinău had been pressured not to sign the document by external forces, especially Washington.
