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The subject that is making headlines in the Brussels press or the media interested in Brussels these days, the gender parity of the von der Leyen II Commission, is actually five years old. The von der Leyen Commission achieved this parity in 2019. The only thing new is the seemingly curious fact that in 2024 this may not happen. Beyond the final composition of the "government of Europe", which is not known at the time that I’m writing these lines, the subject itself is a red thread for how the next Commission will work and for how times change.
The 2019 edition of the European Commission functioned, for most of its term, with a quasi-parity of 13 women to 14 men. According to the calculations that are currently being made, the 2024 format may include only 9 female commissioners, besides the president herself, Ursula von der Leyen. And that thanks to the last-minute nominations made by Belgium and Romania, Hadja Lahbib and Roxana Mînzatu respectively, resulting in a composition of approximately 40% women-60% men. Brussels political circles seem to have accepted the situation and if nothing unforeseen happens until the final appointment of the Commission, which is expected in November, we can try and read in this situation a series of changes in mentality.
Whatever we may think about the fairness and positive nature of gender equality, it is certain that in 2024 it is less important than in 2019. Europe's priorities, as stated by the centrist political parties supporting the new Commission, include primarily defense capabilities and migration policies. Adding tacitly to that are the goal of a coherent and consistent geopolitical stand of the European Union and, if we read between the lines of official political documents, a better adaptation of the Green Pact to the actual reality, seen in massive farmers’ protests, which portend a broader critical stand of the electorate. In addition, the Green Deal can destabilize the European economies –the powerful German car industry, still based on fossil fuel, is a telling example in that respect.
Another explanation for the fact that gender parity matters less in 2024 is that we are dealing with a Europe where there may be more claims from the member states in the relation with the center. It is a situation that is being created against the backdrop of the legitimacy crisis of the "Franco-German engine", with an Olaf Scholz in a steep political decline and an Emmanuel Macron who has managed to miraculously save himself for the moment, but can no longer aspire to the dominant role he played a few years ago. The member states may be less willing to yield to a controversial (albeit unverbalized) criterion like gender parity at the expense of their own political arrangements.
What we get in exchange for some old and controversial men
According to the above reasoning, Romania and Belgium seem to have done it. Roxana Mînzatu was preferred to older proposals (Victor Negrescu, and another name that was widely circulated in the past: Mihai Tudose), as was Hadja Lahbib, the current foreign minister of Belgium, who left Didier Reynders, a resounding name in European politics and the Commissioner for Justice in the Executive that is now finishing its term, bereft of “colleges”. While the name of Victor Negrescu was mentioned in laudatory contexts in relation to European politics, those of Tudose and Reynders create the impression of a male generation past maturity, with a controversial history, handing over the baton to a young female set, with an inevitably shorter past , therefore, just as inevitably, less controversial. Or not?
Regarding Hadja Lahbib, the current foreign minister of Belgium, I’ve said before that she is a former TV presenter who caused a scandal, after being appointed as a minister, because of a trip she made in 2021 to the annexed Crimea, on a Russian visa, to report from a festival staged by a pro-Russian organization. Lahbib took a different stand from the rest of Europe (but shared by Hungary) also when Jens Stoltenberg, the Secretary General of NATO, proposed the creation of a 100-billion-euro aid package for Ukraine, for the next four years, expressing her reluctance towards this commitment.
The Belgian press is also reluctant towards the country's current foreign minister. Le Soir quotes a source as saying that Lahbib "doesn't technically master all the subjects" of diplomacy. This after she became foreign minister through a "surprise parachuting", according to La Libre Belgique. An expression that could characterize several European commissioner appointments.
On the other hand, the Romanian candidate, Roxana Mînzatu, can at most be criticized for having too little political stature for the position of commissioner. Her nomination is interesting because of the targeted portfolio, but we'll come back to that later.
Lahbib and Mânzatu can be considered two symptoms of the manner in which the von der Leyen II Commission will work. It’s an infusion of political figures without impressive stature, who could be prone to docility towards the President of the Commission, just as they were towards those who appointed them. The same class includes the Croatian Dubravka Šuica, wanted by Zagreb again in the position of commissioner, after in the 2019-2024 term she held the imposing position of vice-president of the Commission, but with a decorative portfolio, for Democracy and Demography. Šuica was what is colloquially called in Brussels "commissioner without DG" (without Directorate or Directorate General), in other words deprived of resources and an administrative apparatus.
Ursula von der Leyen’s antagonists: Breton and Fitto
In an age when women with impressive political backgrounds are inevitably fewer than men, Ursula von der Leyen's potential antagonists in the second Commission can only be two men, the Frenchman Thierry Breton and the Italian Raffaele Fitto. The fact that Breton was reappointed by France, after a turbulent relationship with Ursula von der Leyen in the first team and announced intentions to run for the presidency of the new Commission, is conclusive both for France's negotiating power and for the capabilities of Breton, a politician interested in things like the chip industry or the space industry. These are essential areas, in which he has created funds and institutional frameworks so that Europe does not fall behind the USA or China. According to Die Welt, Breton is targeting the portfolio for industry and strategic autonomy. In Eurospeak, the second field translates into defense, a critical chapter, in which Europe is deficient and in relation to which Ursula von der Leyen had initially announced her intention to create a new portfolio. It’s being potentially taken over by Breton as well may be a further indication of France's position of strength.
Beyond his own CV, Raffele Fitto could play a key role in the next Commission because, as a representative of the ECR, on the Fratelli d'Italia line, he is "Meloni's man", and the opening of the centrists from Ursula von der Leyen’ EPP to the radicals in the ECR is no longer a novelty. However, the CV is not to be neglected, because Fitto has a centrist past, though in populist parties like Silvio Berlusconi's, so he can be considered, until proven otherwise, a moderate that illustrates the reorientation (at least for the moment) towards moderation of the party led by Giorgia Meloni.
A more difficult commission for the president to manage
To imagine the next Commission as a brawl between girls and boys, in which the girls are led by the "comrade principal" von der Leyen, and the boys by the equally leonine Thierry Breton, is mere caricature. Or, if we really want to do it, we have to include in the girls’ team Latvia's Valdis Dombrovskis, re-appointed by his country after a very close relationship with von der Leyen in the first team. However, even assuming that gender parity is a simple political pretext, which is not the case, Ursula von der Leyen will have more trouble disciplining the second Commission, because, one way or another, the member states have imposed their point of view in a greater proportion than in 2019, against the same background of the diminishing influence of the two great European powers, Germany and France. Seeing things differently, this somewhat opens a corridor of opportunity for less important states, like Romania.
For now, the first von der Leyen Commission has proven that gender parity is anything but a destructive principle. This is the Commission that has gone through three major impasses, of which two unimaginable crises at the beginning of the mandate – Brexit, COVID-19 and the War in Ukraine – and managed them successfully. Probably, it could have been better - or worse - but the connection with gender parity is very difficult to make
Postscript about Romania
After the "landslide" victory of the PNL-PSD alliance in the European Parliament elections held in June, Romania was in a very good position, with a substantial contribution of 19 "centrist" members of the European Parliament from PNL and PSD alone, irrespective of the bitter taste this victory may have left for the young, progressive electorate. However, the advantage was not capitalized on. While the PNL was not even able to get the presidency of a committee in the European Parliament, Marcel Ciolacu’s claim for an economic portfolio for Romania in the European Commission also proved to be the nonsense that it was in the first place. After confusing declarations of intention and numerous names circulated, we had to settle for the candidacy of Roxana Mînzatu, who is apparently considered for Cohesion. Though there’s nothing much we can say about the biography of the current Social-Democratic MEP, the targeted field is interesting. Cohesion funds are distributed to states that have a GDP per capita lower than 90% of the EU average and, as such, are traditionally the bread and butter of domestic experts in European funds.
As the holder of a lower GDP in the EU, Romania shows that it is clearly interested in these funds, and if we wonder what is unnatural in this, we should recall the acrobatics performed by Liviu Dragnea in 2013, when he created the first of his two National Local Development Programs from the country's own resources, because the European money came "with too many conditionalities", in other words, it was harder to steal. It is not clear, however, whether our officials will face a surprise, because Brussels is planning a radical reorientation in terms of the same cohesion funds, which it will make conditional on "performance" in the adoption of "reforms". And that because it has supported authoritarian and anti-EU regimes enough, such as the one in Hungary or the Polish one, which has become history in the meantime.
Whatever the next governing team in Bucharest, it will very much want the European funds that Liviu Dragnea was trying to get rid of, so nationalism or illiberal slippage à la Viktor Orbán are hard to imagine. In the future PSD government, with or without PNL, Bucharest will be friendly with Brussels and will not necessarily need a stronger commissioner than Roxana Mînzatu. And Brussels will also be friendly with Bucharest, with no other claims than having the latter connected to its policies and goals and no longer cutting off its nose to spite its face. As seen in the past, they do tend to come together.
