
The Pandemic has shaped the perception of the citizens in the Republic of Moldova about the East and the West. Whereas one year ago, Russia and China were very cleverly scoring points in terms of visibility in Chișinău, over the last 12 months the roles have been reversed with the EU and Romania.
The latest iData survey shows that Romania’s image in the Republic of Moldova improved substantially, particularly after sending some 72,000 anti-COVID-19 shots to Chișinău.
The number of people with a high confidence rate in Romania, who’ve responded in favor of uniting with this country, has grown from 37.5% in January and February, to 43.9% in March. During this interval, Romania delivered two batches of anti-COVID vaccines to the Republic of Moldova.
According to the same survey, 67.8% of respondents support Moldova’s EU accession. On the other hand, the number of supporters of Moldova’s accession to the Euroasian Union dropped from 48% to only 40% in just two months.
As regards the types of vaccines Moldovans are willing to receive, the survey marks a paradox that can only be explained if we look at the continuous disinformation campaigns in the media. The top vaccines preferred by Moldovans are Sputnik V, with 35.4%, followed by Pfizer with 18.9%, AstraZeneca with 9.2% and Moderna with 1.83%.
Alternatively, another study published last month by the Russian center for sociological studies Levada reveals that 62% of Russians refuse to take the Sputnik V jab, many of these being young people aged 18-24.
Therefore, the Sputnik V vaccine is preferred by the citizens of the Republic of Moldova rather than those of the Russian Federation. Moreover, Sputnik V hasn’t even been rolled out in the Republic of Moldova yet, and chances the vaccine is imported to Chișinău are rather low, considering Moscow lacks both the political will in this respect as well as the capacity to produce and sell the vaccine.
Russia’s media assault
Mistrust in Western vaccines can be explained from the point of view of a barrage of fake news and manipulation from Russia. Russian propaganda is extremely effective in Chișinău, being disseminated on TV, online, both in Russian and in Romanian.
Moreover, pro-Russian parties or oligarchs with local interests hold a large share of the Moldovan media, which has played an important role with respect to the perception of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova regarding the management of the pandemic in the West and in Russia.
Against its decreased resilience to fake news and disinformation, the Republic of Moldova has been intensely bombarded by fake news and manipulation on this topic since the beginning of the pandemic in the winter of 2020. Pro-Russian TV stations and websites in Chișinău have smeared the West non-stop regarding the COVID-19 pandemic.
Moscow has launched a series of narratives via its propaganda channels about a purported EU selfishness, about the lack of solidarity and cohesion at EU level and the fact that under no circumstances will the EU step in to help the Republic of Moldova.
At domestic level, the first to start the series of disinformation was president Igor Dodon himself, and the former Prime Minister, Ion Chicu, starting the moment “patient zero” was reported on March 7, 2020. The patient was a woman who had returned to Moldova after getting infected with COVID-19 in Italy. Dodon revealed her personal data, including the fact that she is also a citizen of Romania.
From here, it was just a short step to stigmatizing the entire Diaspora. Dodon and Chicu urged Moldovans to stay in the West in order not to bring the coronavirus from European countries to the Republic of Moldova as well.
Media war in times of pandemic
Over the entire course of last year and to this day, Moldova was the stage of a true war of attrition over who helps the country the most, Russia or the European Union, amidst an excess of political debate over this topic owing to the presidential election held in Moldova in November 2020.
In this respect, Moscow had a slight advantage at the start of the pandemic. On April 19, 2020, a Russian aircraft landed in Chișinău, carrying 59 tons of medical equipment from China. The pro-Russian president at the time, Igor Dodon, greeted the aircraft at the airport alongside the Russian and Chinese ambassadors. The three therefore scored a reputation boost and presented Russia and China as two forces able to help the Republic of Moldova in times of pandemic, unlike the EU.
Moreover, president Igor Dodon taunted on his videoblog the EU ambassador to Chișinău, Peter Michalko. “Where’s the money, Peter boy?”, an allusion to the fact that the EU had provided no financial assistance to Chișinău so far, despite having promised to do so.
Help from Russia and China subsequently turned out to be less of a fact than Dodon had previously argued. In fact, the Russian aircraft did not come without a cost, since the Republic of Moldova tax-exempted Lukoil for the fuel costs of that delivery.
Similarly, the Chinese provided no help, as all the medical equipment had been procured from money consisting in donations from Moldovans at home and abroad, from companies and other international organizations, including UNICEF.
Meanwhile, the EU got things started in terms of the assistance mechanism for the Republic of Moldova, and in May 2020, the EU’s contribution started having visible effects.
Romania sent Chișinău 20 trucks filled with medical equipment, including masks, protection gowns, goggles, face shields, etc., worth a total of 3.5 million Euro. Apart from materials, Romania also dispatched a team of 42 physicians who volunteered for this mission.
Despite the fact that the transport was received by Chișinău authorities under a bridge outside the city, perception on Romania had a positive boost. Even those who traditionally have a negative image of Romania appreciated this humanitarian gesture.
Additionally, a number of other EU and NATO member states, Lithuania, Hungary, Germany, Austria and others, started sending help to Chișinău.
The EU picks up the torch from Russia
This was the moment the torch was passed on. Russia could no longer keep up with the West in supporting the Republic of Moldova. Hence the change in perception. Starting with the summer of 2020, Russia no longer made any difference in its perception warfare with the EU.
Authorities in Chișinău, however, continued to behave as if the COVID-19 crisis was merely a matter of secondary importance, which would be anyhow overcome with Moscow’s help: while all the other countries in the world were trying to buy vaccines in their testing phase and were signing contracts for later delivery, Igod Dodon and the Chicu Cabinet did nothing, being more concerned about the election campaign.
Shortly after the development of the Russian Sputnik V vaccine in August, 2020, Dodon hoped bringing the Russian vaccine to the Republic of Moldova would earn him a new presidential mandate. “If I get the chance to visit Moscow, before the start of the election campaign”, I will “ask the Russians to give me some 100,000 doses of this vaccine (there!)”, Dodon said in early September, 2020.
Then, over the entire course of the election campaign, Dodon referred to the Sputnik V vaccine as a bailout solution for Moldova, but the vaccine never arrived, not to this day. Dodon lost the election, and probably the worst part is that the Republic of Moldova has no strategy and has signed no contract with any international manufacturer for the delivery of anti-COVID vaccines. Not even in the case of Sputnik, relying all this time on donations from Moscow.
Promises honored by Romania and the EU
Maia Sandu’s victory in the presidential election last year coincided with the certification and market rollout of a number of vaccines – Pfizer, AstraZeneca and Moderna. The first promise of a delivery came with the visit to Chișinău of Romania’s president, Klaus Iohannis, at the end of December, 2020. At the time, the Romanian head of state promised the Republic of Moldova 200,000 dozes of vaccine from its own stocks.
Romania donated 21,600 shots of the AstraZeneca jab on February 27, allowing the Republic of Moldova to begin the vaccination of medial workers in the front line. Then, a second delivery of 50,400 doses of AstraZeneca shots arrived in Chișinău on March 27, 2021, taking the total number of vaccines to 72,000. Romania’s ambassador to Chișinău said on April 8 Romania is ready to send a third batch of vaccines to the Republic of Moldova.
In turn, the EU has sent 14,400 anti-COVID-19 shots to the Republic of Moldova under the COVAX mechanism.
Moreover, on March 19, Moldova received another 24,570 dozes of anti-COVID vaccine, also under the COVAX mechanism.
The transport was welcomed on Chișinău International Airport by president Maia Sandu accompanied by the EU and US ambassadors. Whereas a year ago, Igor Dodon and the Russian and Chinese ambassadors attended the airplane delivery of medical equipment, now it was the turn of Maia Sandu and Western officials to display solidarity in times of pandemic.
Actors involved in the Republic of Moldova have switched roles, and Moldovans’ perception on who really helps the Republic of Moldova has changed too. Russia has become a power uninterested in lending Chișinău a helping hand, while the EU’s image in Moldova has improved considerably.
Moreover, public perception on Romania has scaled up as well, visible in the percentage of Moldovans who call for a unification. It remains to be seen whether Romania can do more, which would further expand its good reputation in the Republic of Moldova.
Last week, the Expert Forum NGO submitted a petition to president Klaus Iohannis and Prime Minister Florin Cîțu, calling for the mass-vaccination of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova, irrespective of those holding the Romanian citizenship or not. At present, a large number of Moldovans with Romanian citizenship cross into Romania to get immunized in vaccination centers in northeastern Romania.
Under these circumstances, public perception on Romania and the EU can only go up, whereas Russia’s inability to provide assistance to Chișinău is becoming increasingly transparent. Politically speaking, this is also visible in opinion polls and the approval ratings of Moldovan parties.
The Action and Solidarity Party (PAS) currently has a score of over 40%, which is the largest score ever obtained by a pro-European party in the Republic of Moldova in its thirty years of existence.
To conclude, if Romania and the EU continue to help the Republic of Moldova by sending vaccines and medical equipment, this will help shape a positive perception on the two and will impact the approval rating of pro-European parties ahead of the early parliamentary election in the Republic of Moldova.