Georgia was once considered the most reformist and pro-Western country in the former Soviet Union, with the exception of the Baltic republics. However, the last decade was marked by a slowdown in reforms and a rapprochement with Moscow, and the result was that Georgia did not receive the EU candidate status along with the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine.
From the Rose Revolution to choosing a pro-Russia oligarch
Georgia was the first ex-Soviet country to experience a color revolution - the Rose Revolution. It was the beginning of a string of processes that other states such as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Kyrgyzstan went through, sometimes twice. These processes made the Kremlin rather nervous. The biggest fear of the de jure and de facto descendants of the Soviet nomenclature was the possibility that these revolutions would spread to Russia, which somehow happened in December 2011 and later during the demonstrations in Balotnaya Square, in 2012. But the nomenclature quickly lined up against the citizens and made the necessary decisions to save the system, without caring for people's need for rights and freedoms.
In August 2008, after the Russian-Georgian war, Georgia, through its leaders, further reaffirmed its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, even though Russia had tried to repress them through its aggression and NATO, at the Bucharest summit, had refused to provide clear integration prospects. The Tbilisi leadership received all the necessary support from its partners to recover not only from the aftermath of the war, but also to withstand one of the world's biggest economic crises. So, the Georgian authorities had all the resources at hand to continue the reforms, to implement public policies and to build a true rule of law, as promised by Saakashvili.
But we all know that, although there had been some results appreciated by the European and American partners, Georgia chose a different leadership in 2012, one whose head, Bidzina Ivanishvili, facilitated a bilateral dialogue with Russia, considerably changing the attitude of the political factor towards the aggressor. Even if the population was not happy with the connections the leader of the Georgian Dream party had with Moscow, the choice was determined by certain decisional slips on Mikhail Saakashvili’s part. After several political scandals, Saakashvili, once a reformist president, was forced not only to withdraw from Georgia's political life, but also to leave the country.
The “Georgian Dream”and moving away from the European dream
What followed for Georgia is quite typical of many states that undertook to advance on the pro-European path: defining a Euro-Atlantic foreign policy vector, but without “embracing” the values and principles of a true democracy. Behind the appreciative statements for the European development model were decisions that sabotaged or significantly slowed down the implementation of reforms. Moreover, in an attempt to preserve their power, many political parties, including the Georgian Dream, have adopted strategies that have hampered the efforts of their predecessors.
Even if it did not invalidate the Georgians’ pro-European momentum, the majority party facilitated the penetration of the “Russian octopus” model in the country’s political life, where small circles of interests are guiding the domestic and foreign affairs in one direction: towards changing the system in order to keep the reins of power for an indefinite period. Not directly, but through examples of “best practice”, in which the role and place of democratic exercises begin to be more or less clearly annulled either by constitutional reform or by changes to the electoral system. This is exactly what the Georgian Dream proposed to the voter.
The strategy chosen by the ruling party, to stay in power at all costs, including by promoting electoral formulas for which states like Georgia are not prepared, stifling protests, independent journalism, the opposition, all the critical voices that is, has considerably changed the attitude of the Western partners towards one of the most reformist states in the former USSR. Georgia is no longer a “model of good governance”. The indicators used to asses the democratization model have shown that the regression has been slow but constant.
Gradually, the interest in active diplomacy in favor of obtaining the Euro-Atlantic perspective subsided. The Georgian Dream also succeeded, through determination and using the resources it had at its disposal, in influencing the attitude of a part of society towards the European prospects, If we analyze the public speeches carefully, we will notice that they have tried to suggest that the European partners in Brussels have avoided a more serious dialogue with states like Russia, that the support is more declarative, just to avoid serious discussions about deepening the bilateral dialogue with Georgia and that Georgians will be left indefinitely “knocking” on the doors of Europe, asking to be accepted as part of the European family.
Missing the candidate status is evidence that Europeans do not trust Tbilisi's current government
The European Union's decision not to grant the status of candidate country to Georgia can be justified, even understood. The decision was a pragmatic one, not only from a security perspective, as it is geographically closer to Russia; it was also the result of an analysis that took into account the interlocutor that mediates this pro-European dialogue on behalf of the Georgian people.
Following the parliamentary elections held in the autumn of 2020, Georgia entered a protracted political crisis, despite the European Union's intervention and mediation of complicated talks between the Georgian Dream party, which had obtained enough votes to maintain its influence, and the United National Movement (UNM - the party of former President Mikhail Saakashvili). Of course, there are other political parties, but they fail to change the governing formula too much and are forced to form a coalition in government or on the street with one of the holders of the first two places.
Moreover, for some of them even the participation without results is already a success because the electoral system offers to the participants in the process the perspective of obtaining some financial resources from the state budget. The harsh challenging of the results of the October 2022 elections and the opposition representatives’ refusal to accept the deputy mandates showed that Georgian society is extremely divided, with very different views and perspectives on the governing act, but also on how the partnership with the Russian Federation should evolve. It is very important to mention Moscow here, because it is an important part of the speeches given by the opposition parties, the UNM in particular.
The mediation of the dialogue between the government and the opposition allowed European leaders to better understand their Tbilisi partner and to assess whether there will be changes in the governing act. Yes, European mediators will accept any interlocutor chosen by the Georgian people, but this does not mean encouraging the proposed model of governance if it contradicts the fundamental principles of the European Union. Hence the list of prerequisites and the different phrases used to appreciate the evolution of the dialogue between Tbilisi and Brussels. As pressing as regional security may be, it must be based on a genuine democratic model that is sustainable over time. European integration is not done for a single term of a certain party. Indeed, the political actors do the negotiating, but they do so in the name of the national interest of a state.
Georgians cannot forget about Russia’s aggression and still want to be part of the EU
Although I said earlier that the European Union's decision to maintain the European perspective for Georgia was a very pragmatic one, given the way the country has been governed, the interaction with Russia and its envoys is no less complex. Although the éminence grise, Bidzina Ivanishvili, managed to stabilize the bilateral discussion in a certain format, the Georgian citizens are not in favor of a deepening of this interaction, neither politically nor economically.
Moreover, in recent years he has constantly campaigned against the presence of Russian officials at legislative meetings or against Moscow's position on the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia is a state that has violated Georgia's territorial integrity, and this cannot be forgotten and even less accepted.
Georgians would not want their rulers to take over the country leadership model from the Kremlin, or the slippage in respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, the pressure on civil society and journalists, and the repression against opposition leaders.
The phrase “awarding the European perspective” used in the final document of the European Council has generated frustration in Tbilisi. Not necessarily against the European Union. Georgians took to the streets to ask the authorities for an explanation for their country's decision. They demand a correction of the ruling party's vision with regard to the European aspirations and insist on concrete action. De facto, this manifestation should be read by the rulers as a signal of the beginning of the erosion of the governing act, even if the UNM fails to break the majority in the Georgian parliament. Here, too, a point of clarification is needed: it was not a party, but the Georgian society that was protesting. That impressive number of people on the streets (about 120,000 people according to media reports) is a result of the cohesion of society around challenging the process of transforming Georgia into an authoritarian government that has taken the country away from a decision similar to that made for the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine.
Georgians do not blame European leaders for the decision. They do not dispute it, but they don’t accept it either. They understand the argument about democratization and the political system. But at the same time, the rhetorical question is: has Georgia somehow been relieved of Russian aggression in the last 30 years? 20% of the country's territory is occupied, the two republics separating Abkhazia and South Ossetia being recognized only by Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Nauru and Syria.
Even if the answer is that there’s been no less Russian aggression in Georgia, the responsibility lies with the rulers, who have not displayed as active a diplomacy as that of Ukraine or the Republic of Moldova in recent months, but also due to hesitations to join the sanctions, including discursive, against Russia. Citizens punished this attitude by taking to the streets immediately after the EU announced the European perspective, without offering the status of candidate country.
The Prime Minister of the country, Irakli Garibashvili, has described the decision of the European Union as historic and promised the citizens that he assumes the responsibility for obtaining the status of candidate country in the shortest time, by fulfilling all the necessary conditions. Georgia has enough critical mass among civil society to monitor these promises. The next period will be a real test for the Georgian Dream, but also for the opposition forces and society. The stakes are far too high to be missed.
