It’s easy to lose the bigger picture when too many things are happening at once locally. Bulgaria deep-dived into a continuous election cycle (2021-2023), which furtherly underlined the divisions between the leading parties, and came on surface with a fragile coalition. During this time, the topic of Bulgaria and Romania’s Schengen much-delayed accession often appeared as a catchphrase to signal a pro-EU position but has been rarely discussed in-depth, often staying in the background of the political events. By the end of 2023, Bulgaria is sobering for the fact that the uphill battle to become part of the Schengen Area is far from over and even out of the country’s immediate control of the events.
Keeping the Schengen doors closed may fuel anti-EU sentiment throughout the region
After the two-year stalemate, Bulgaria’s current cabinet formed in June on the promise of swift entrance in the Schengen area and in the Eurozone. Curbing Russia’s meddling and being part of these expansion processes was one of the few points at which the two opposing blocks – longtime Prime Minister Boyko Borissov’s GERB party aligned with United Democratic Forces on one end and reformist duo We Continue the Change and Democratic Bulgaria – could agree on, amid the little levels of trust between the leaders.
Bulgaria has been facing another potential logjam: further delay in joining the Schengen area along with Romania (the countries have been bundled in their mutual efforts to be part of EU’s enlargement since 1995 when they applied for EU membership – this becoming a fact in 2007).
The expected December 5 vote by the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council on whether Bulgaria and Romania will finally join the area will likely not be part of the agenda until early 2024: for Bulgaria, there seems to be less and less options to impress EU-enlargement opponents Austria and The Netherlands and an imposing feeling that the country is at the mercy of those skeptical about its Schengen membership.
On Bulgaria’s side, the Schengen entrance is not just a long-awaited event in terms of Bulgaria’s European integration or an opportunity for increased business developments, but also a symbol that a pro-West perspective, even a fragile one, is what keeps the government intact (sarcastically called in local media “the pieced together one” and “the non-coalition coalition”).
For We Continue the Change - Democratic Bulgaria, the entrance would mean a renewed faith in EU values. “Bulgaria has fulfilled all the requirements for its acceptance into the Schengen area, and any further delay is unacceptable and demotivating for our country”, said PM Denkov on November 22, his words hinting that the said demotivation might further increase anti-EU sentiments not only in the country but on the Balkans. For GERB - UDF, a positive development would solidify the image of the coalition as one protecting the Euro-Atlantic profile of the government. On November 30, GERB’s Boyko Borissov said to local media that there are still “realistic chances” for ascension.
Furtherly, Bulgaria’s entrance must be carved out while internal conflicts in the government are only expected to increase: part of the deal between GERB and We Continue the Change was implementing a rather curious strategy, one of “rotating Prime Ministers” every nine months. Since June, the government is headed by Prime Minister Nikolay Denkov of We Continue the Change, formerly an Education Minister. In March, Denkov is expected to step down and give way to former EU Commissioner Mariya Gabriel of GERB, currently Vice Premier. Although Denkov and Gabriel are so far working in unison, the switch is likely to boost GERB’s role in the government.
However, even if these moves might inform the landscape in Bulgaria, according to experts, the internal conflicts are of little importance outside of the country or for the enlargement perspectives.
Bulgaria may be less prepared to join the Schengen area, but separating it from Romania won’t be in Bucharest’s best interest
“Whether there is stability or instability inside Bulgaria, is of little relevance. It’s all about Austria and the Netherlands, notably after the victory of Geert Wilders, not wanting the [Schengen] area’s enlargement”, Dimitar Bechev, an author and lecturer at Oxford’s School of Global & Area Studies, told Veridica.
Somehow ironically, Bulgaria and Romania’s entrance is now dependent on the well-known skepticism of The Netherlands and Austria, two countries in the middle of their own election dramas. After far-right candidate Geert Wilders came out as the unexpected winner of the Dutch general elections earlier in November, his anti-immigrant and isolationist ideas were quickly interpreted as a headache for Bulgaria, now possibly fighting for its place amid a different political landscape. Meanwhile, Austrian chancellor Karl Nehammer remains adamant of his veto on Bulgaria and Romania despite the European Commission and the European Parliament calling for the two Balkan countries to be admitted.
Bulgaria is seen as the more risky candidate, given the country’s questionable ability to control and regulate migration through its border with Turkey - last year's negative decision on the entrance in the area came right after investigations for violent pushbacks. Through 2023, reports for smuggling and pushbacks, and several instances of death among people on the move found abandoned, often found place in local news, usually with little follow-up or clear response by authorities.
In its latest analysis on the topic, from November 30, Capital Weekly asserts that a partition of Bulgaria and Romania’s candidacy might be a possible scenario, relying on sources in the European Parliament: “Diplomats in Brussels reconfirm that Austria holds a tougher position against Bulgaria's accession. In light of the parliamentary elections in Austria in 2024, Chancellor Nehammer's ruling party is likely to give in to populism and not highlight internal political dividends to open its borders to the East, especially with Bulgaria. It is because of this that Romania might take action to take a separate way.” Bulgaria MEP Andrey Kovachev directly pointed to Nehammer’s rhetoric as an easy bait before the 2024 elections: "He simply decided that reigniting this topic could give them a few percentage points more to lift their results in the next elections", Kovachev said in Strasbourg on November 21.
Already back in December 2022, after the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council's voted against Romania and Bulgaria joining the area, Chairman of Romania’s Social Democratic Party (and currently Prime Minister) Marcel Ciolacu said that there are better chances if Romania runs solo. He made similar hints in November. However, according to Capital, this remains a rather unpopular opinion within the MEP’s circles.
“Such a development seems highly unlikely as for Romania that would mean big expenses to build an interior Schengen border with Bulgaria, which after some time, would also join. A collaborative candidacy is still in Bucharest’s interest”, adds Bechev for Veridica.
