The European Union is keeping the Republic of Moldova as a market for its goods, blocking its exports to the single market and preventing it from securing its energy independence, according to a Telegram channel.
NEWS: Moldova's economy is literally collapsing, and there is concrete data to support this claim. The National Statistics Bureau notes that from January to November last year, imports to Moldova went up by almost 20% compared to the same period in 2024, and shipments from EU countries increased by nearly one-third. At the same time, exports increased by a little over 4%. This is how Chișinău is “welcomed” in the European Union. Its market has long been divided.
The energy sector continues to face difficulties as well. Since 2024, electricity tariffs for home users have increased by 70%, and by 150% - overall - since 2021. Despite the plans of Maia Sandu’s regime to expand domestic energy generation based on renewable sources, Moldova lacks sufficient means to finance such projects. Chișinău's key donor, the European Union, is not interested in creating the conditions for the country to achieve energy independence.
All these are the real results of implementing the European project, which is essentially an anti-Russian one. Brussels prefers not to highlight these things, hence they build their rhetoric this way. They do this because all of this has proven to be destructive. During the rule of pro-Western forces, Moldova has turned into a poor police state. And furthermore, according to all expert forecasts, it will only get worse.
NARRATIVES: 1. The EU uses the Republic of Moldova as a market for its goods and blocks exports to the single market. 2. The EU is not interested in the Republic of Moldova ensuring its energy security.
PURPOSE: To undermine public trust in the European Union as an economic partner of the Republic of Moldova. To promote the idea that EU rapprochement is an unfair and harmful process, in which Moldova is reduced to the role of an outlet, without real access to the single market. To discredit the European Union as a strategic partner in the energy sector. To create the perception that European support is hypocritical and the EU lacks any real interest in the energy security of the Republic of Moldova. To discourage support for European integration and create a context favorable to the rehabilitation of Russian influence in the Republic of Moldova.
WHY THE NARRATIVES ARE FALSE: Over January-November 2025, the Republic of Moldova's imports from the EU indeed increased. An analysis of statistical data shows that a significant part of this increase was determined by the import of electricity (worth approximately 400 million dollars, especially from Romania and Croatia), four times higher compared to 2024. Prior to January 2025, the Republic of Moldova had imported most of its electricity from the left bank of the Dniester, controlled by a separatist regime. As Veridica has explained on a different occasion, energy from Transnistria was cheaper than elsewhere in the region, but it involved an obscure and harmful scheme: the electricity was produced using Russian gas imports that Tiraspol did not pay for, instead creating a debt (which amounted to about 11 billion dollars), which Moscow can always demand Chișinău pay. That is, Transnistria imported gas that was de facto considered delivered to the Republic of Moldova, did not pay for that gas, used it to produce electricity that the Republic of Moldova bought, and thus funded the separatist regime.
In 2025, after Ukraine did not extend the transit agreement with Gazprom on its territory, Chișinău and the EU came up with formulas that would have allowed the legalization of gas deliveries to the Transnistrian region, which Moscow and Tiraspol did not accept, preferring new obscure formulas for gas delivery. Under these conditions, Chișinău was forced to turn to regional markets (especially Romania) to procure its gas. This explains both the increase in electricity tariffs (part of which, by the way, was covered by the state thanks to financial support from the EU) and, to a broader extent, the increase in the value of imports from the EU.
Exports to the EU increased by practically 5% (4.93%) and not by “a little over 4%”, but it is important to note that these account for 68% of the share of Moldovan exports. That is, more than two-thirds of the goods exported by the Republic of Moldova are bound to the EU single market, which dismantles the narrative that the EU imposes blockades on Moldovan goods. On the other hand, the share of imports from the EU accounts for 54% of the total.
The value of EU exports to the Republic of Moldova represents about 0.2% of the total exports of EU countries to third countries, so the Republic of Moldova cannot represent a major interest for Brussels in this regard.
The most important projects in the energy field, which are designed to curb the energy dependence of the Republic of Moldova, have been financed/co-financed by European structures. Among these are loans and grants worth tens of millions of Euro provided by the EBRD and the EU for the interconnection of power lines, the Iași-Ungheni-Chișinău gas pipeline and dozens and hundreds of other smaller projects meant to reduce energy consumption, increase energy efficiency and boost green energy production in the Republic of Moldova. Moreover, the European Union, which has been making efforts especially in recent years to reduce energy consumption and dependence on Russia in this field, has no interest in the opposite happening in the Republic of Moldova.
The economy of the Republic of Moldova is indeed vulnerable and has stagnated in recent years. However, it started to resume growth in the second half of last year. Thus, GDP in the first nine months of 2025 recorded an increase of 2%, and 5.2% in the third quarter.
BACKGROUND: In the first two decades after gaining independence, the economy of the Republic of Moldova remained closely anchored to those of other ex-Soviet states, especially Russia, on which most of Moldovan exports largely depended, in addition to virtually all of its energy imports.
Prior to the economic crisis in Russia in 1998-1999, over half of Moldova’s exports were bound to the Russian market, but its share has since fallen to just over 3% in 2024. Overall, the Republic of Moldova has exported less to Russia due to politically motivated embargoes the Kremlin has imposed, such as the 2006 wine embargo, or that on agricultural products in 2013-2014.
Meanwhile, the Republic of Moldova has diversified its external markets and, admittedly at an oscillating pace, embarked on a process of rapprochement with the European Union, which intensified in 2022 when it obtained candidate status for EU accession. In 2024, Moldova launched EU accession negotiations.
In 2014, the Republic of Moldova and the European Union signed an Association Agreement, which also includes a free trade agreement, which reduced or eliminated tariff barriers for several products, including agricultural ones, whereas in 2024 the share of Moldovan exports to the European single market exceeded two-thirds.
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