The electoral battle in the Republic of Moldova between the pro-European and the pro-Russian parties is also reflected in the way polling stations are organized. The PSRM-PCRM bloc is counting on the votes of Transnistrian population, while PAS hopes to win the votes of those who went to work in Europe, the diaspora. The electoral authority has also been involved in this fight, trying to reduce diaspora’s ability to vote.
The diaspora’s interest in the elections in the Republic of Moldova has increased from one election to another against the background of the exodus of young people who went to work abroad: 10 thousand voted in 2005, 17 thousand in 2009, 140 thousand went to the polls in the 2016 presidential elections (round II), and in the 2020 presidential election, a record number of Moldovan citizens went to the polls abroad: 160,000 in the first round and 260,000 in the second round, accounting for almost 16% of the total number of people who cast their vote. The diaspora electorate is dominated by young people who see their future with the European Union, and their vote goes to pro-European politicians and parties - 95% of them supported Maia Sandu in the autumn elections.
The interest of the pro-European diaspora in the electoral process in the Republic of Moldova could not be counterbalanced by an equally massive turnout at the polls opened in the Russian Federation, where a large number of Moldovan citizens who are supposed to prefer left-wing, pro-Russia parties also work. Only about 15,000 people voted there last year.
Against this background, the Plahotniuc-Dodon regime tried to attract the vote of the citizens on the left bank of the Dniester. If in the parliamentary elections held from 1994 to 2014, between 4 thousand and 9 thousand voters from the left bank of the Dniester participated, in the elections of 2016, 2019 and 2020 the number exceeded 30 thousand. But their interest does not seem to be dictated by the concern for what is happening in the Republic of Moldova: they were transported en masse and in an organized manner to the polls and information appeared in the public space that they were paid to vote. At the same time, it is clear that the voting process was coordinated together with the secessionist regime in Tiraspol, because until then the separatists had obstructed any manifestation associated with the democratic electoral process.
According to the Constitution, authorities are obliged to organize the electoral process, observing the right to vote of all citizens, including those in the Transnistrian separatist region, an area that is not under the control of Chisinau. However, the citizens of the Republic of Moldova residing on the left bank of the Dniester have been largely deprived of the right to vote. Over the nearly 30 years since the 1992 war, elections have been marked by obstacles gradually built by the Tiraspol regime, on the one hand, and the negligence of the Chisinau authorities, on the other. Moreover, most citizens on the left bank of the Dniester are not well informed about the political situation in the Republic of Moldova, having no access to the press there, and political actors in Chisinau cannot run election campaigns in the region controlled by the separatist regime in Tiraspol. The Transnistrian propaganda is targeted against the Republic of Moldova, described as an aggressor state against the Transnistrian people.
Last year, under the pretext of the Covid pandemic, Tiraspol introduced traffic restrictions for the population, installing dozens of illegal checkpoints. However, on the election days, November 1 and 15, it allowed the lifting of this restriction, following the agreements between Igor Dodon and the separatist leader in Tiraspol, Vadim Krasnoselski.
In the 2020 election, opposition parties, residents of villages where polling stations were set up, former combatants from the 1992 war oversaw the voting process in order to try to prevent organized voter transportation and rigging. The press, election observers and representatives of political parties published numerous videos showing the organized transportation of citizens from the Transnistrian region and how votes were bought, cars lining up near polling stations, voters brought by bus to the bridge on the Dniester, and taken from there to the polling stations by car or on foot.
Just like the 2016 presidential elections, in the November 2020 elections, the citizens who voted at those polling stations massively elected Igor Dodon, who accumulated 86% of the votes. In the parliamentary elections of February 2019, over 51% of the votes cast at those stations were for PSRM.
For the early parliamentary elections of July 11, 2021, the Central Electoral Commission decided to open 44 polling stations for voters in the Transnistrian region, two more than last year. At the same time, the CEC decided the organization of three polling stations in localities that are not controlled by the constitutional authorities - two in Tighina (Bender) and one in Corjova. The decision was criticized by experts, by representatives of political parties, but also by the Intelligence and Security Service, who warned of the risk of setting up sections in localities under the control of the separatist regime. The CEC has revised its decision and will no longer organize the three polling stations in Tighina and Corjova. Thus, 41 polling stations will be set up for voters in the Transnistrian region for the elections due on July 11, 2021. Experts believe that a number of 28 polling stations would have been enough.
For the July 11, 2021 election, the CEC decided to set up only 139 polling stations, as in last year's election, although the Foreign Ministry requested the opening of at least 190 and more than 100,000 people had stated their intention to vote abroad by signing up in the online register. The CEC decision triggered discontent at home and abroad, was denounced by the organizations that monitor the electoral process, and the pro-European political parties attacked it in court, supported by the Ombudsman. Against the background of the protests organized at the CEC, the electoral authority increased the number of polling stations by only seven, to 146.
The Court of Appeal began examining the case regarding polling stations for the diaspora on June 10, and the session was adjourned several times, as the recusal of judges examining the case was requested. Finally, on Thursday, June 17, the Chisinau Court of Appeal forced the CEC to take into account the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which recommended the opening of 191 polling stations for the diaspora. If the decision of the Court of Appeal is upheld, the Central Electoral Commission will re-establish the number of polling stations to be set up abroad. Some experts believe that the case is being intentionally delayed so that the number of polling stations requested by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot be ensured, and the Court of Appeal postponing a decision regarding polling stations abroad is explained by magistrates' fear of taking responsibility.
Pro-European parties – especially PAS - have high hopes for the diaspora votes, given that the 263,000 people who voted in the latest election accounted for about 16% of the total number of votes. It is a high enough percentage to decide the winners of the elections and to give an important advantage to the pro-European, right-wing parties, which are preferred by the diaspora.
On the other hand, there is a huge potential for the left in Transnistria - there are 250,000 eligible voters in the region, and the more people go to the polls, the greater the possibility that the left will be able to counter-balance the votes in the diaspora. If it goes to the polls, Transnistria has the potential to prevent Moldova's rapprochement with the European Union.
It is unlikely that the mobilization will be strong enough to nullify the votes in the diaspora. But it is clear that in recent years the battle for geostrategic orientation has been increasingly carried out between the Soviet-origin separatist region and the Westernized diaspora.
Disinformation uses a variety of manipulation tactics. Disinformation stories can easily be created by combining provocative topics.
Report
Not even the most optimistic supporters of the Action and Solidarity Party (PAS) were expecting a landslide victory in the early parliamentary election. PAS didn’t just face left-wing parties, represented by the Electoral Bloc of Communists and Socialists, but Russia itself, which tried to lend the latter a helping hand. Yet its victory is only the beginning: the real challenge for PAS lies ahead.
FAKE NEWS: The right-wing bought votes in the Diaspora
The alleged election fraud, including bribe-giving, was one of the hot topics in the Republic of Moldova on election day. While media outlets siding with pro-European parties revealed alleged cases of bribe reported on the left bank of the Dniester, the pro-Socialist press focused on offenses reported abroad. One the main “arguments” about influencing voters in the Diaspora was a short video filmed by a young girl queuing outside a polling station in Frankfurt, Germany. In the background one can hear a few people talking and laughing, mentioning 50 Euro. A large number of press institutions affiliated to the Socialists carried the piece of news, suggesting the video is evidence that voters got bribed. The person who shot the video subsequently said it was all a joke, and that the media made erroneous assumptions.
DEMAGOG 2021. The Chisinau Report, No. 5: Radio Yerevan
disinformation, manipulative stories and fake news continued to flood the media as usual. Maia Sandu, PAS and the West were again the favorite targets of disinformation and fake narratives. Fake news authors were pretty much unimaginative, as they have been over the course of the entire campaign, resorting to narratives they used before, both in the current campaign, as well as in previous ones: a victory for the right-wing would spell disaster for the country
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